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Abstract—We propose an integrated architecture for smart
grids, that supports data aggregation and access control. Data
can be aggregated by home area network, building area network
and neighboring area network in such a way that the privacy
of customers is protected. We use homomorphic encryption
technique to achieve this. The consumer data that is collected is
sent to the substations where it is monitored by remote terminal
units (RTU). The proposed access control mechanism gives
selective access to consumer data stored in data repositories and
used by different smart grid users. Users can be maintenance
units, utility centers, pricing estimator units or analyzing and
prediction groups. We solve this problem of access control using
cryptographic technique of attribute-based encryption. RTUs
and users have attributes and cryptographic keys distributed
by several key distribution centers (KDC). RTUs send data en-
crypted under a set of attributes. Users can decrypt information
provided they have valid attributes. The access control scheme
is distributed in nature and does not rely on a single KDC
to distribute keys. Bobba et al. [1] proposed an access control
scheme, which relies on a centralized KDC and is thus prone
to single-point failure. The other requirement is that the KDC
has to be online, during data transfer which is not required in
our scheme. Our access control scheme is collusion resistant,
meaning that users cannot collude and gain access to data, when
they are not authorized to access. We theoretically analyze our
schemes (with mathematical proofs of correctness) and show
that the computation overheads are low enough to be carried
out in smart grids. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first work on smart grids, which integrates these two important
security components (privacy preserving data aggregation and
access control) and presents an overall security architecture in
smart grids.
Keywords: Access control, Decentralized attribute-based
encryption, Bilinear maps, Homomorphic Encryption, Smart
meters
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grids are next generation electricity grid system
which will integrate power and communication networks.
With the growing demand for electricity, there is a need
to develop smart grids which can cope up with the de-
mand by intelligently using different power resources and
integrating different components like vehicles, and wireless
devices. Smart grids should have capabilities that would
enable it to deal with power outages by balancing supply
and demand. This can be achieved by intelligently balancing
the consumption between peak and off-peak periods. One
recent suggestion has been to charge electric vehicles (also
incorporated into the grid) during the off-peak period and
discharge it back into the grid. In this way the grid is bi-
directional, energy can be used when needed and discharged
back into the grid when not needed.
The operation of smart grid involves many aspects: gen-
eration of power using different sources like solar, wind,
geothermal, nuclear, fossil-fuel, the intelligent distribution
of power by monitoring the demand of power in different
regions and different customers, monitoring the power usage
by customers using smart meters and intelligently deliver
power when needed, building and integrating appliances into
the grid, like vehicles (plugged in electric vehicles - PHEV)
and wireless devices.
Research in smart grid is very important and involves a
broad range of problems. An important problem is to design
an architecture integrating all the components which can
efficiently use electricity. Smart grid architectures have been
proposed and discussed by Bose [2]. It comprises of power
infrastructure and information infrastructure [3]. Power in-
frastructure consists of power equipments like generators,
transformers, transmission lines, voltage regulators, capacity
banks, meters etc, which help to deliver electricity. The power
infrastructure involves generation of power from different
sources and their reliable and efficient transmission. Energy
efficient distribution of power is presented in [4] and [5].
The information infrastructure helps in communication and
ensures safety and reliability. It measures the status of the
devices in the grid, balances demand and supply, helps in
diagnosis of faults, helps authentication of devices and helps
in the smooth working of plugged in devices like vehicles.
Devices might have sensors to sense different conditions and
can be simple devices as smoke detectors and automatic light
switches etc. There are also devices called phasor measure-
ment units (PMUs) which measure electrical waves in the
grid. PMUs are clock synchronized (through GPS) sensors
that can read current and voltage phasors at a substation bus
on the transmission power network [1]. These phasors can
send 50-60 measurements per second [6]. Load balancing is
an important aspect of research. Direct load control (DLC)
[7] can remotely control appliances in homes and workplaces
and reduce energy consumption. Game theoretic techniques
are being increasingly used to optimize consumption. One
way to do this is consumption scheduling [8].
2There is a huge economic aspect of smart grids and
demands a lot of attention. This relates to pricing and
marketing policies, legal and ethical issues. At one hand
it is important to switch towards green energy like solar,
wind etc and on the other hand it is important how to make
best use of these renewable sources of energy and integrate
them into the grid. It might be easier to use the energy close
to the source to reduce transmission loss and costs. Several
pricing policies are also being regulated by the government.
These also require manual and ethical considerations. For
example, reducing the consumption of electricity at peak
hours. Critical-peak pricing (CPP), real-time pricing (RTP),
time-of-use pricing (ToUP) are popular ways of reducing
consumption. These policies impose different rates during
different time of the day (more during peak hours) or year
(cold days in winter and hot days in summer).
Control decisions of embedded systems in critical infras-
tructure can have significant impact on human life and the
environment. Cyber physical systems need to combine com-
putational decision making on the cyber side with physical
control on the device side. The network that connects intel-
ligent devices must ensure that critical data are available for
making informed decisions. Smart grid with all its advantages
must be fault tolerant, reliable and secure. It should be
possible to detect fault early in the system, to protect against
cascading effects.
Conventional power grids utilize centralized command and
control structures, such as SCADA (Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition) systems relying on human monitors for
decision making. SCADA systems provide the mechanism for
identifying faults. However, they represent a single point of
failure within todays power grid. Further, even when SCADA
systems are running with specified parameters, catastrophic
faults (e.g. cascading failures) can occur [9]. Detecting faults
earlier in the network is extremely important because faults
can easily propagate throughout the network and lead to
complete breakdown. Such a blackout occurred in August
2003, which affected 45 million people in US and 10 million
people in Canada. The damages due to this blackout has
been estimated as 6 billion US dollars. Thus, designing
fault tolerant grid is very important. In this direction, it
should be possible to divert the power to alternate route
once a particular route is disrupted. Zimmer and Mueller [9]
proposed a fault tolerant network routing through software
overlays.
An important problem which is associated with smart grid
is the problem of security and privacy. It is very important to
secure the smart grid, not only from terrorist attacks, but also
from customers, and building authorities who tamper with
various devices. The information from remote terminal units
(RTU) at the substation is needed not only for electricity dis-
tribution, but also for calculating costs, for predicting future
conditions and for monitoring in case of unexpected behavior.
All these tasks are done by separate users, for example the
electrical and maintenance board will monitor the network,
the costs calculation and analysis is done by the auditing unit
and to predict future behavior researchers can be involved.
All information must be sent only to the users responsible for
specific job. Access control thus becomes a very important
issue in smart grids. In future, when content distribution
will also be included into the smart grid (our assumption is
that future smart grids will also have cable integrated into
it), it will be necessary to regulate the access, such that
two or more users do not collude and access information
they cannot individually access. Existing literature focus on
either authentication authentication [10], [11], [12] or privacy
protection [13], [14]. Surveys on security and related aspects
of smart grids appear in [15].
We present a security architecture that integrate privacy
preserving data aggregation and access control for the first
time. Data aggregation has been studied by Li et al. [16],
however it is very limited in scope. It presents privacy
protected data aggregation in a local neighborhood (typically
a building area network) without focusing on large scale
aggregation. It also does not say how keys are distributed
and more concerned with efficient construction of data ag-
gregation trees. Access control has been studied by Bobba
et al. [1]. They proposed a policy based encryption scheme
for access control in smart grids. The main assumption is
the existence of a fully honest key distribution center (KDC)
who distributes keys and access policies to data senders
and receivers. A receiver can decrypt information, if it has
a valid set of attributes. The policies are implemented in
XML and the encryption mechanism uses KEM-DEM hybrid
encryption paradigm introduced by Cramer and Shoup [17].
KDC distributes keys and access policies.
The scheme in [1] is prone to failure if the single KDC
is compromised. It also demands the KDC be online during
data access, thus halting all activities during failure or mainte-
nance. For reasons of efficiency and security, multiple KDCs
is desirable. For this reason, we use multiple KDCs. Our
access control scheme is based on attribute based encryption
protocol, which is being increasingly used for access control
in different domains like clouds [18], ad hoc networks [19]
etc.
Our architecture consists of two parts, the first network
consists of home area networks (HAN), building area net-
work (BAN) and neighborhood area network (NAN) which
reports to a substation. For each home area network there
is a gateway smart meter han which collects information
and sends to the building area network. The gateway ban
aggregates all information from smart meters in the BAN
and sends to the nan at the neighborhood area. nan reports
to the substation.
The second part consists of the RTU at the substation
who send aggregated results to data centers for storage. The
data centers distribute information to users for maintenance,
auditing, future predictions etc. We solve the problem of
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privacy-protected aggregation at different levels like HAN,
BAN, NAN, transmitting to RTU and then providing access
control of the data stored at the data repository. The smart
grid architecture is depicted in Figure 1.
The data aggregation network on the left side of Figure 1
collects and aggregates data and sends to the RTU at the
nearest substation. The right side of the Figure 1 shows
the access control network, consisting of RTUs, KDCs, data
repository and users.
Aggregation at each stage uses Paillier additive homomor-
phic encryption [20] which ensure that data can be aggregated
only knowing the ciphertext, so that the plaintext can be
hidden. This will protect the privacy of individuals as well as
a particular locality. Access control operates in the following
way: The RTU collects information from different units and
sends to the data repository, encrypting the data under a set
of attributes. Attributes of data can be the source of energy
like solar, fossil-fuels, etc, or type of user like individual
or corporate or plugged in vehicles, or the type of load
like lower consumption equipment (as in lights, television)
or high consumption equipment (dryers, heaters etc). The
RTU can also add new attributes depending on the time
of collection (peak/offpeak time), type of user who can
access (like engineers, environmentalist), location of the user
(region/city) etc. In this way the RTU builds an access policy
for the data.
The task of the KDC is to distribute keys to the RTU and
users, such that the data is securely kept in the data repository
and retrieved only by authorized users. The KDCs can be
energy management units who manage key distribution for
attributes like source of energy, or power control units who
look after key distribution for different types of equipments
(like high-energy consumption or low energy consumption)
or administrative officers who distribute keys depending on
the type of user that the RTU wishes to give access. The
KDCs also give keys to the users to enable them to decrypt
messages, depending upon the attribute they possess. For
example if a environmentalist is interested in green energy
(like solar/wind) then he/she is given keys corresponding to
these attributes.
Different users of data can access information stored in
the databases, provided they have a valid access structure.
For example, a maintenance unit might want to collect
information from residential and corporate users, which run
on fossil fuel and which have have consumed more than
a given limit of electric power per day. Researchers on
the other hand might be interested on predicting load due
to charging and discharging of plugged in hybrid electric
vehicles (PHEV) during day time. For each RTU, the key
distribution centers distribute attributes and public and private
keys. The RTUs might have specific access policies. The
RTUs encrypt the data with keys (depending on the access
policy) and sends to the storage units.
The data repository is responsible for both storing and
processing information. It can have several data storage
centers. Processing can be done by one or several data
processors, which can provide efficient search techniques or
help organize the data in databases. We will not consider
such aspects here. Users are also given attributes and secret
keys. When users request data from the data repository, then
they can decrypt those data that have matching attributes. We
apply a recent variant of attribute-based encryption, proposed
4by Lewko and Waters [21], modified according to the needs
of smart grids.
Since a smart grid has a bidirectional flow of information,
another feature can be added, in which users can send
information to selected RTUs. For example the maintenance
units can ask certain RTUs to reduce power consumption in
certain units on certain weekends (for electrical maintenance)
or involve in a more complicated tasks. Current RTUs are
programmable and in future it would be possible to incorpo-
rate more features into them.
A. Our contribution
• We propose a new security architecture for smart grids,
integrating privacy preserving aggregation and access
control.
• Aggregation of data at gateway smart meters of BAN,
HAN, NAN is done using homomorphic encryption.
• We propose an access control scheme which gives
limited access to data users like audit teams, tech-
nical maintenance teams, engineers, environmentalists,
research groups, policy makers, management groups,
etc.
• The scheme is collusion secure, in that no two users can
collude and gain access to data they alone cannot avail.
• Malicious and illegal users can be revoked .
• We evaluate the performance and show it is feasible in
the smart grids.
• We provide a list of open problems not considered
before and provide partial solution to these.
B. Organization
The paper is organized in the following way. We present
related work on security and privacy issues of smart grids in
Section II. This section also discusses Paillier’s cryptosystem
[20] and Lewko and Water’s scheme [21]. In Section III, we
describe mathematical tools, network model and assumptions
used in our work. We discuss data aggregation in details in
Section IV and access control in Section V. In Section VI
we analyze the security and performance of our scheme and
compare with existing ones. We present open problems in
Section VII and conclude in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we first present related work on security
in smart grids. We discuss previous work on homomorphic
encryption and show why we chose Paillier’s [20] homo-
morphic scheme for data aggregation in smart grids. Then
we discuss several attribute based encryption techniques to
show why Lewko and Water’s [21] is most suited to access
control in smart grids.
A. Security and privacy in smart grid
As we noted in the introduction that security is an impor-
tant aspect of smart grid, not only to protect from military
threats but also protect from misbehaviors of consumers and
different service providers integrated into the grid. Security
issues in smart grid mainly focus on authenticating cus-
tomer, operators, and service providers. There are several
components in smart grids like SCADA (Supervisory control
and data acquisition), cellular and mobile links, fiber optic
cables etc. Security of each of these components is essential
in securing the grid. The cyber security requirements of
smart grids have been outlined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [22]. To protect smart
grids smart grid PKI infrastructure has been proposed. This
infrastructure should provide certification to the various com-
ponents and devices in the network. Specific certification
policies need to be issued [15]. Device attestation (ensuring
the validity of the device) is an important requirement, since
an invalid device can collect and send wrong electricity
readings and can result in overloading and failure.
It is also important to authenticate the message sent by
devices and components in the network. Each device has an
identity. Fouda et al. [10] proposed a message authentication
protocol for a Smart grid which has the following network
structure: The home area network (HAN) consists of individ-
ual apartment units which collect and report to the building
area network BAN, which further report to the neighborhood
area network (NAN). There are gateway smart meters in-
stalled in each unit in a HAN, BAN and NAN that collect
information and send to the next level. The communication
in HAN is done using IEEE 802.15.4 Zigbee radio commu-
nication [23]. The authors propose authentication techniques
using Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol, Sign-and-Mac
(SIGMA) and Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) [24]. The
message authentication techniques has less communication
overheads compared to the scheme proposed in [25]. In [11],
the authors proposed an authentication of metering messages
which they claim to have less overheads.
Privacy in smart grid has been extensively studies because
of its importance. Though we want to know the amount of
consumed data, we do not want to know the details, for
example which user uses which appliance and at what time.
This is to protect the privacy of the user. Studying the details
of consumed data helps to deduce the behavioral pattern to
a certain extent.
In order to annonymize the metering data, Efthymiou and
Kalogridis [26] proposed a third party key escrow policy and
uses several pseudonymous IDs instead of unique identifiers.
Rial and Danesiz [27] proposed a privacy preserving protocol
for smart meters using zero knowledge proof [28], which
ensures correct payment of fees with disclosing the details
about consumption data. The protocol is implemented into
smart meters and is generic enough to consider different
billing settings like electronic traffic pricing, pay-as-you-
drive car insurance etc.
However, imposing privacy policies can affect the util-
ity. Very recently Rajagopalan et al. [13] quantify (using
Gaussian model) how the utility is affected when privacy
5preservation is applied. They proposed that filtering out
frequency components that are low in power can achieve an
optimal utility-privacy solution.
Access control has not been studied much, even though
there is a big need for it. Bobba et al. [1] presented a
centralized access control scheme. As mentioned before,
in the introduction, these scheme has a drawback because
centralized authority can be a single point of failure. It also
requires that the KDC is online during data transfer. So the
system is affected when the KDC is faulty or switched off
for maintenance. ABE was discussed in connection to access
control in smart grids in [1], but was not applied.
We now present an overviews about homomorphic encryp-
tion and then ABE.
B. Overview of homomorphic encryption schemes
The main idea for using homomorphic encryption is to
carry out different operation on ciphertext and return results
without knowing the plaintext messages. It has been largely
used in voting mechanisms where the individual votes should
not be known but the decision is important. This is done in
order to achieve privacy of the voter. Homomorphism has
also been applied to data aggregation in ad hoc networks
(for example [29]). Several encryption techniques exists
which support different homomorphism, like multiplicative
homomorphism (RSA [30]), additive homomorphism (Pail-
lier [20], Boneh-Goh-Nissim [31]) or recently proposed fully
homomorphic scheme [32] which can support complicated
functions. During aggregation, we need to add the results
as such we choose Paillier’s cryptosystem, which supports
additive homomorphism. Boneh-Goh-Nissim [31] is not a
suitable choice because the set of messages in their system
is very restrictive.
C. Overview of attribute based encryption
ABE is a cryptographic protocol proposed by Sahai and
Waters in 2005 [33]. The main idea is to distribute attributes
to receivers and attributes to senders so that only receivers
with matching attributes structure can access the data. Data is
encrypted using attribute based keys, which are distributed by
a central key distribution center (KDC). It is to be noted that
identity based encryption (IBE) proposed by Shamir [34] is a
special form of ABE, where senders have one unique attribute
(i.e., its identity). The protocol proposed by Sahai and Waters
was restricted that only threshold access structures (t-out-
of-n) could be supported. This means that if the receiver
has t attributes (out of n) in common to the sender, then
it can decrypt the message. Goyal et al. [35] proposed a
new ABE which can handle any monotonic access structure.
These schemes are known as key-policy based (KP-ABE)
schemes.
Another type of protocols are known as ciphertext-policy
ABE (CP-ABE) [36] (proposed by Bethencourt). In these the
ciphertext is encrypted using a set of attributes under a given
access structure. If a receiver has a matching set of attributes
then it can decrypt the information.
All the above schemes relied on a central key and attribute
distribution center, which is prone to failures. Chase [37] pro-
posed a multi-authority (same as multi-KDC) protocol, where
several KDCs generate and distribute keys and attributes.
There is also a central trusted authority who coordinates
the multiple KDCs. To completely do away with central
authority, Chase and Chow [38] proposed a scheme where
the authorities can coordinate amongst themselves, but do
not require a central authority. The drawback of this protocol
was that the access structure was specific and required each
user to have at least one attribute from each KDC. Both these
scheme were KP-ABE.
Recently Lewko and Waters [21] proposed a multi-KDC
CP-ABE, which does not have trusted authority and coordina-
tion between the KDCs. It also allows any type of monotonic
access structure. We use Lewko and Waters scheme to design
an access control mechanism for smart grids.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section we present our network model and the
assumptions we have used in the paper. Table I presents
the notations used throughout the paper. We also describe
mathematical background used in our proposed solution.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Symbols Meanings
Uu u-th User
Ti i-th RTU
hani Gateway smart meter at i-th HAN
bani Gateway smart meter at i-th BAN
nan Gateway smart meter at NAN
Aj KDC j
A Set of KDCs
W Set of attributes
w = |W| Number of attributes
Lj Set of attributes that KDC Aj possesses
lj = |Lj | Number of attributes that KDC Aj possesses
I[j, u] Set of attributes that Aj gives to user Uu
Iu Set of attributes that user Uu possesses
PK[j] Public key of KDC Aj or RTU Tj
SK[j] Secret key of KDC Aj or RTU Tj
ski,u Secret key given by Aj corresponding to attribute i
given to user Uu
S Boolean access structure
R Access matrix of dimension n× h
|G| Order of group G
M Message
Pj Power consumption by gateway at jth HAN
C, c Ciphertext
PKT [i] Packet sent by smart meter gateway i
H Hash function, example SHA-1
A. Network model
Our network model consists of two parts:
1) First part is to collect data from consumers and aggre-
gate them at different levels. There are smart meters
at each household which collect information about
6electrical usage by the consumer. This is the home area
network (HAN). The gateway smart meter processes
data and sends to the smart meter at the BAN, which
then aggregates and sends to the smart meter at NAN.
The NAN gateway sends information to the substations.
2) Second part is similar to currently deployed Control
and Data Acquisition, and Energy Management System
(SCADA/EMS). It consists of remote terminal units
which collect information from the NAN and other
sources like PHEVs and sends to the SCADA/EMS. In
our model, SCADA/EMS consists of data repository
which stores the data collected by the RTU. It also
has data processors to process data. There are also
key distribution centers who distribute keys to RTU
and users. This architecture consisting of RTUs, data
repositories, KDCs and users is similar to [3], however
they didn’t address the problem of access control.
Data aggregation was also not included. Users can be
system engineers, maintenance offices, auditors, policy
makers, researchers etc.
The architecture is presented in Figure 1.
B. Assumptions
We assume that each device has an identity (an IP ad-
dress) and can authenticate itself before interacting with the
network. We will not design an authentication protocol here,
but rely on the authentication protocol [10], which has been
designed specially for Smart grid communication.
All the smart meters at the data aggregation centers of
BAN, HAN and NAN are assumed to honest but curious.
This means that they always send correct aggregated results,
but would like to know the data that it receives from the
previous smart meter aggregator. Hence, we assume that
data aggregation smoothly, but there is a need to protect the
consumer’s privacy.
We also assume that the data storage center is honest but
curious. This means, it can attempt to read the contents of
the ciphertext and the attributes that the ciphertext might
be carrying. The RTUs are also honest but curious, so we
hide the privacy of individual customers. However, we must
remember that when the RTUs are sending messages, they
can choose their access policies according to their discretions,
depending upon the data they are sending.
As mentioned earlier, attributes can be one or more of the
following types (but not limited to)
1) Type of energy source: fossil fuel, solar, hydroelectric-
ity, wind.
2) Type of consumer: Individual, corporate, PHEV.
3) Location of the consumer: City, region.
4) Type of appliances: Need based. For example essential
like light, heat etc. Lower priority: Dryer, washing
machine.
5) Load based: High electricity consumption equipments
like dryer, oven etc, low electricity consumption equip-
ments like lights, television etc.
6) Type of user: Electrical engineer, power engineer, en-
vironmentalists, policy makers etc.
These attributes do not reveal the identities of the users,
because the RTU collect these information from the users
and aggregate them. Hence, there is no risk of the mainte-
nance offices, researchers, policy administrators to know the
individual identity. Thus, individual’s privacy is protected.
C. Formats of access policies
Access policies can be in either formats 1) Boolean
functions of attributes or 2) Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
(LSSS) matrix. Any access structure can be converted into a
Boolean function [21]. An example of a boolean function is
((a1∧a2∧a3)∨ (a4∧a5))∧ (a6∨a7)), where a1, a2, . . . , a7
are attributes. Boolean functions can also be represented by
access tree, with attributes at the leaves and AND(∧) and
OR(∨) as the intermediate nodes and root. Our pseudo-code
of an algorithm that converts a Boolean function (in the form
of access tree) to a LSSS matrix is given in the Appendix.
The algorithm is described in [21] as follows. Root has vector
(1). Let v[x] be parent’s vector. If node x=AND, then the left
child is (v[x]|1), and the right child is (0, . . . ,−1). If x=OR,
then both children also have unchanged vector v[x]. Finally,
pad with 0s in front, such that all vectors are of equal length.
The proof of validity of the algorithm is given in [39]. Fig.
3 shows an access tree with initial vectors. The rows of R
are the required vectors.
D. Mathematical background
We will use bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. Let G be
a cyclic group of prime order q generated by g. Let GT be a
group of order q. We can define the map e : G×G→ GT .
The map satisfies the following properties:
1) e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zq ,
Zq = {0, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1}.
2) Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1.
We use bilinear pairing on elliptic curves groups. We do
not discuss the pairing functions which mainly use Weil and
Tate pairings [40] and computed using Miller’s algorithm
[41]. The choice of curve is an important consideration,
because it determine the complexity of pairing operations.
A survey on pairing friendly curves can be found in [42].
PCB library (Pairing Based Cryptography) [40] is a C library
which is built above GNU GMP (GNU Math Precision)
library and contains functions to implement elliptic curves
and pairing operations. The curves chosen are either MNT
curves or supersingular curves.
E. Paillier homomorphic scheme
In this section we discuss Paillier’s [20] homomorphic
scheme which we will use for secure data aggregation
protocol. We will first discuss the encryption protocol and
show how it can be used to support homomorphism. Let i be
the receiver for whom a message is intended. The protocol
consists of three algorithms:
71) Key generation: This algorithm generates the public
keys, and global parameters, given a security parameter.
Let N = q1q2, where q1 and q2 are primes. Choose
g ∈ Z∗
N2
, such that g has order a multiple of N
modulo N2. Let λ(N) = lcm(q1−1, q2−1), where lcm
represents least common multiple. Then public key of
i is PK[i] = (N, g) and secret key SK[i] = (λ(N)).
2) Encryption: Let M ∈ ZN be a message. Select a
random number: r ∈ Z∗N . The ciphertext c is given
by
c = E(M) = gMrN mod N2 (1)
3) Decryption: To decrypt c, M can be calculated as
M = D(c) =
L(cλ(N) mod N2)
L(gλ(N) mod N2)
mod N, (2)
where the L−function takes input from the set {u <
N2|u = 1 mod N} and computes L(u) = (u−1)/N .
Additive homomorphism is demonstrated in the following
way. Suppose c1 = E(M1) and c2 = E(M2) are two
ciphertexts, for M1,M2 ∈ ZN . Then, D(c1.c2 mod N2) =
M1 +M2 mod N . Thus, the sum of the ciphertext can be
obtained from the plaintext.
We note that rN is used only to make the homomor-
phic computation indeterministic, the same message can be
encrypted into different ciphertexts, to prevent dictionary
attacks.
F. Lewko-Waters ABE scheme
Lewko-Waters [21] scheme consists of four steps: 1) Sys-
tem Initialization, 2) Key and attribute distribution to users
By KDCs 3) Encryption of message by sender 4) Decryption
by receiver.
1) System Initialization: Select a prime q, generator g of
G, groups G and GT of order q, a map e : G×G→ GT , and
a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G which maps the identities
of users to G. The hash function used here is SHA-1 [43].
Each KDC Aj ∈ A has a set of attributes Lj . The attributes
disjoint (Li⋂Lj = φ for i 6= j). Each KDC also chooses
two random exponents αi, yi ∈ Zq . The secret key of KDC
Aj is
SK[j] = {αi, yi, i ∈ Lj}. (3)
The public key of KDC Aj is published:
PK[j] = {e(g, g)αi , gyi, i ∈ Lj}. (4)
2) Key generation and distribution by KDCs: User Uu
receives a set of attributes I[j, u] from KDC Aj , and corre-
sponding secret key ski,u for each i ∈ I[j, u]
ski,u = g
αiH(u)yi , (5)
where αi, yi ∈ SK[j]. Note that all keys are delivered to the
user securely using the user’s public key, such that only that
user can decrypt it using its secret key.
3) Encryption by sender: Sender decides about the access
tree. LSSS matrix R can be derived as described in III-C.
Sender encrypts message M as follows:
1) Choose a random seed s ∈ Zq and a random vector
v ∈ Zhq , with s as its first entry; h is the number of
leaves in the access tree (equal to the number of rows
in the corresponding matrix R).
2) Calculate λx = Rx · v, where Rx is a row of R
3) Choose a random vector w ∈ Zhq with 0 as the first
entry.
4) Calculate ωx = Rx · w
5) For each row Rx of R, choose a random ρx ∈ Zq .
6) The following parameters are calculated:
C0 = Me(g, g)
s
C1,x = e(g, g)
λxe(g, g)αpi(x)ρx , ∀x
C2,x = g
ρx∀x
C3,x = g
ypi(x)ρxgωx∀x,
(6)
where pi(x) is mapping from Rx to the attribute i that
is located at the corresponding leaf of the access tree.
7) The ciphertext C is sent by the sender (it also includes
the access tree via R matrix):
C = 〈R, pi,C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x, ∀x}〉 (7)
4) Decryption by receiver: Receiver Uu takes as input
ciphertext C, secret keys {ski,u}, group G, and outputs
message M . It obtains the access matrix R and mapping
pi from C. It then executes the following steps:
1) Uu calculates the set of attributes {pi(x) : x ∈ X}
⋂
Iu
that are common to itself and the access matrix. X is
the set of rows of R.
2) For each of these attributes, it checks if there is a subset
X ′ of rows of R, such that the vector (1, 0 . . . , 0) is
their linear combination. If not, decryption is impossi-
ble. If yes, it calculates constants kx ∈ Zq , such that∑
x∈X′ kxRx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). K is a vector consisting
of kx, x ∈ X ′.
3) Decryption proceeds as follows:
a) For each x ∈ X ′, dec(x) = C1,xe(H(u),C3,x)
e(skpi(x),u,C2,x)
b) Uu computes M = C0/Πx∈X′dec(x).
IV. SECURE AGGREGATION BY SMART METERS
In this section we discuss how aggregation takes place at
the gateway smart meters han, ban and nan before it reaches
the substation. We assume that the following architecture
exists: The household meters collect samples the readings
from different equipments and sends to the gateway smart
meter at the HAN. The gateway smart meters han send their
aggregated results and send to the ban. The gateway smart
meter ban, aggregates all the readings from the gateway
meters at HAN meters and sends to the NAN. The gateway
HAN smart meter aggregates all the readings from the
gateway BANs and sends to the nearest substation. This is
depicted in Figure 1 (left side).
8An RTU Ti is securely given PK[i] = (N, g) (as in key
generation step in Section III-E) and also the secret key
SK[i] = λ(N). Each smart meter in the network knows the
public key PK[i] = (N, g) of its nearest RTU substation
Ti. Each gateway smart meter hanj sends a data packet
which consists of two fields: the attributes field f and the
power consumption field Pj . The power consumption field
is encrypted with the public key of the substation. A packet
looks like
PKT [hanj] = f ||cj = f ||E(Pj), (8)
where E(Pj) = gPjrNj mod N2 (rj ∈ Z∗N is chosen
randomly by the smart meter).
This packet is then send to the gateway BAN, banl which
aggregates all the results. Here it checks for the attributes
field. For packets which have the same set of attributes, it
processes the aggregated power consumption. The aggregated
result is given by cbanl = Πj∈HAN cj . The new packet looks
like PKT [banl] = f ||cbanl .
The packets collected by the gateway BANs are then send
to the NAN. It performs a similar operation and aggregates
information from packets having same set of attributes. The
aggregated result is cnan = Πbanl∈BANcbanl . The packet
PKT [nan] = f ||cnan is then sent to the nearest substation.
The RTU Ti at the substation reads the content of the
packet. It then decrypts the aggregated result because it has
the secret key SK[i].
We note that
cnan = Πbanl∈BAN (Πj∈HAN cj)
= Πbanl∈BAN (g
∑
j∈HAN Pj )(Πj∈HAN rj)
N mod N2
= g
∑
j Pj (Πjrj)
N mod N2
Using the value of λ(N), the aggregated message can be
decrypted by the RTU (as given in Section III-E).
We next consider a very small example to show how this
works in practice.
A. Example
We show only the data having same set of attributes. The
aggregation network is shown in the Figure 2.
The HANs collect data from different devices and the
encrypted data c1, c2, . . . , c5 to the respective BANs. Here
ci = g
PirNi mod N
2
, for i = {1, 2 . . . , 5}. The BAN
gateways aggregate the results. ban1 calculates
cban1 = c1c2 = g
P1+P2(r1r2)
N mod N2,
while ban2 calculates
cban2 = c3c4c5 = g
P3+P4+P5(r3r4r5)
N mod N2.
The BAN gateways then send to the NAN, which aggregates
the result as
cnan = cban1cban2 = c1c2c3c4c5
= gP1+P2+P3+P4+P5(r1r2r3r4r5)
N mod N2
When RTU receives ciphertext cnan, then decrypts it
suing its secret key λ(N) as
D(cnan) =
L(cλ(N)nan ) mod N
2)
L(gλ(N)) mod N2)
mod N
= L(g
(P1+P2+P3+P4+P5)λ(N)) mod N2)
L(gλ(N)) mod N2)
mod N
= P1 + P2 + P3 + P4 + P5.
This is because (r1r2r3r4r5)Nλ(N) = 1 mod N2.
Fig. 2. Example showing data aggregation
V. ACCESS CONTROL SCHEME
We will first provide a sketch of the scheme and then
discuss it in details.
The parameters are chosen and distributed to the KDCs
when they are installed. The attributes and key generation
has been presented in III-F.
Encryption proceeds in two steps. The Boolean access tree
is first converted to LSSS matrix. In the second step the
message is encrypted and sent to the data storage center along
with the LSSS matrix. A secure channel like ssh can be used
for the transmission.
Suppose an RTU Ti wants to store a record M . Ti defines
the access structure S, which helps it to decide the authorized
set of users, who can access the record M . It then creates
a m × h matrix R (m is the number of attributes in the
access structure) and defines a mapping function pi of its
rows with the attributes (using Algorithm in Section III-C).
pi is a permutation, such that pi : {1, 2, . . . ,m} → W .
The encryption algorithm takes as input the data M that
needs to be encrypted, the group G, the LSSS matrix R,
the permutation function pi, which maps the attributes in the
LSSS to the actual set of attributes. For each message M ,
the ciphertext C is calculated as per the Equations (6) and
(7). Ciphertext C is then stored in the data repository.
9When a user Uu requests a ciphertext from the repository,
the requested ciphertext C is transferred using ssh protocol.
The decryption algorithm proceeds as in Section III-F4, and
returns plaintext message M , if the user has valid set of
attributes.
A. An Example
Suppose an RTU sends a data record to the data repository.
This data can be the amount of electricity consumed over
a certain period of time by high-consumption equipments
which are run by fossil fuels. The RTU can give access
to either researchers and policy makers or give selective
access to environmentalist working on fossil-fuels or power
engineers who are supervising the usage of high-consumption
equipments. There can be three types of KDC: 1)Type of
users: D1 (Researchers) , D2 (policy makers), D3 (Power
engineers), D4 (Environmentalists), etc, 2)Type of appli-
ance: E1 (High consumption), E2 (Low consumption) etc,
3)Source of power: S1 (fossil-fuels), S2 (solar), etc.
Then the access tree is given in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Access tree structure
The access matrix R can be constructed using Algorithm
in Appendix. Thus,
R =


1 1
0 −1
1 1
0 −1
1 0
1 0


.
An environmentalist working on fossil fuels will be able to
access this data, as also a power engineer monitoring high-
consumption equipments. However an electrical engineer
working on solar cells will not be able to read it.
Let there be three KDCs A1, A2 and A3. The set of
attributes of A1, A2 and A3 are L1 = {D1, D2, D3, . . .}
and L2 = {E1, E2, . . .} and L3 = {S1, S2, . . .}. The RTU’s
access tree is given by Fig. 3. Let pi be denoted as
x 1 2 3 4 5 6
pi(x) D4 E1 D3 S1 D1 D2
.
Suppose an user (user u = 3) is an environmentalist
studying fossil-fuels and solar energy, then he/she is given
the attributes D4, E1 and E2. Thus, I[1, 3] = {D4} and
I[2, 3] = {S1, S2}. Next the user is given secret keys sk4,1
from A1 and sk1,3 and sk2,3 from A3.
During encryption, the RTU sends the information C =
〈R, pi,C0, {C1,x, C2,x, C3,x}x∈{1,2,3,4,5,6}〉 to the data repos-
itory. C0 = Me(g, g)s, where s is chosen at random from
Zq .
When user 3 wants to access the above information C.
C is transferred securely, using ssh (an inbuilt secure shell
standard protocol). The user first finds out the attributes that
are present from pi. He/she also finds that it has the attributes
D4, S1 in common to the attribute in data. From the matrix R
it then finds that there are two rows corresponding to D4 and
S1, such that (1,−1)+(0, 1) = (1, 0) (linear combination of
rows 1 and 2 of R gives (1, 0)).
The user can thus calculate e(g, g)s according to Step 4
of the decryption mechanism. Once e(g, g)s is calculated, M
can be obtained. The data repository does not have the secret
keys, and is unable to decrypt the message.
B. Revocation of users
Users can be revoked, either because they are faulty or
have been tampered with. Once revoked, these should not be
able to decrypt messages, even if they have valid attributes.
We present a revocation mechanism to achieve this.
For each revoked user Uu, Iu is noted. Once the attributes
Ii are identified, all data that possess the attributes are
collected. For each such information record, the following
steps are then carried out:
1) A new value of s, snew ∈ Zq is selected
2) The first entry of vector vnew is changed to new snew
3) λx = Rxvnew is calculated, for each x ∈ Ii
4) C1,x is recalculated for x ∈ Ii
5) New value of C1,x is securely transmitted to the storage
center
6) New C0 = Me(g, g)snew is calculated and stored in
the storage center
7) New value of C1,x is not stored with the data, but is
transmitted to users, who wish to decrypt the data.
We note here that the new value of C1,x is not stored in
the data centers but transmitted to the non-revoked users who
have attribute x. This prevents a revoked user to decrypt the
new value of C0 and get back the message.
VI. ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE
A. Security of aggregation mechanism
We will first show that the aggregation scheme gives
correct results when the intermediate smart meter (HAN,
BAN, NAN gateway) is honest. We will then prove that
the privacy of not only individual customers but also that
of intermediate smart meters in BAN and NAN is preserved.
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Theorem 1: The aggregation scheme presented in Section
IV gives correct results when the intermediate smart meter
(HAN, BAN, NAN gateway) is honest.
Proof: We first note that the decryption step given in
Equation 2 is correct. cλ(N) mod N2 and gλ(N) mod N2
both equal 1, when raised to the power of N . This is because
g has an order which is a multiple of N . Thus, cλ(N)
mod N2 and gλ(N) mod N2 are both N -th roots of unity.
Such roots are of the form (1+N)β = (1+βN) mod N2.
Hence, the L-function can be computed as L((gM )λ(N)
mod N2) = ML(gλ(N) mod N2) mod N . (details of
proof appear in [20]). From this, the value of M can be
obtained.
For our aggregation scheme,
cnan = g
∑
j Pj (Πjrj)
N mod N2.
We note that ((Πjrj)N )λ(N) = 1 mod N2. Thus,
D(cnan) =
L((g
∑
j Pj )λ(N) mod N2
gλ(N) mod N2
mod N
=
∑
j Pj , (by similar argument as above).
Theorem 2: Data aggregation scheme proposed in Section
IV protects the privacy of customers and all nodes in BAN
and HAN.
Proof: Pailler’s cryptosystem is intractable under Deci-
sional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) [20]. A
customer sends encrypted data of its power consumption. The
data is encrypted using public key of the nearest substation.
As such no user or outsider can decrypt the data unless it
knows λ(N) which is difficult to solve.
Next, we note that even the RTU at the substation cannot
know the individual ciphertexts. This is because it receives
encrypted aggregated results from which individual cipher-
texts cannot be obtained. The use of the factor rN while
encrypting message (r chosen randomly for each message)
helps to transmit the same message as two different cipher-
texts and thus prevents dictionary attacks.
Thus, no user/substation can decrypt data that an individual
customer sends, thus protecting privacy.
B. Security of our access control scheme
We will show that only authorized users (possessing valid
set of attributes) can decrypt the data stored in data repos-
itories. The data center cannot change the content of the
data stored in the data bases. The data center cannot collude
with an user or RTU and decrypt any information it is not
supposed to decrypt. No two users can share their attributes
and secret keys and decrypt any information they are not
supposed to decrypt alone.
Theorem 3: The proposed access control scheme is secure,
collusion resistant, allows access of data only to authorized
users and protects the privacy of individual consumers.
Proof: We will first show that a user can decrypt data if
and only if it has a matching set of attributes. This follows
from the fact that access structure S (and hence matrix
R) is constructed if and only if there exists a set of rows
X ′ in R, and linear linear constants kx ∈ Zq , such that∑
x∈X′ kxRx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). A proof of this appear in [39,
Chapter 4]. For an invalid user, there does not exists attributes
x, such that
∑
x∈X′ kxRx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Thus, e(g, g)s
cannot be calculated. Hence, our scheme allows access of
data only to authorized users.
We next show that two or more users cannot collude and
gain access to data that they are not individually supposed
to access. Suppose that there exist attributes pi(x) from the
colludes, such that
∑
x∈X kxRx = (1, 0, . . . , 0). However,
e(H(u), g)ωx needs to be calculated in Section III-F4. Since
different RTUs different values of e(H(u), g), even if they
combine their attributes, they cannot decrypt the message.
Thus, our access control scheme is collusion secure.
We next observe that no outsider or even the data center
administrator can decrypt any information stored in the
databases. This is because an outsider or a data center ad-
ministrator does not posses the secret keys ski,u (by Eq.(5)).
Even if they collude with other users, they cannot decrypt
data which the users cannot themselves decrypt, because of
the above reason (same as collusion of users). The KDCs
are work autonomously and are not a part of the data center.
Thus, no outsider can decode data stored in the repositories,
without compromising the relevant KDCs. This makes our
scheme secure.
The RTUs receive aggregated results from the HAN, BAN
and NAN. The consumers send encrypted data and it is
never decrypted at any stage. This protects the privacy of
consumer’s data.
C. Performance issues
We will first calculate the cost of aggregation. Encryption
involves modular exponentiation of element g, which can
be done using square-and-multiply technique in O(logN)
time. Decryption involves calculating L(u), which needs only
one multiplication. Decryptions can be hastened using the
technique already given in [20]. At each smart meter gateway
d values have to be multiplied (where d is the indegree of
that smart meter). So the costs are reasonable.
We will calculate the computation and communication
overhead of access control scheme with and without user,
RTU revocation. In the first step of encryption, the access
tree needs to be converted to an access matrix. Time taken
to compute R from S is O(m), where m is the number of
attributes in the access structure. To check if there exists a
set of rows in R (such that step (2) of decryption holds), is
equivalent to solving the equation KR = (1, 0, . . . , 0), for
non-zero row vector K . This takes O(mh). Since the list of
attributes might not be too large, such overhead is very little.
The most expensive operation during encryption or decryp-
tion is pairing. During encryption, each user Uu performs
only one pairing operation (to calculate e(g, g)). For each
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF OUR SCHEME WITH BOBBA et al.[1]
Schemes Robustness Access policy Revocation Online/offline
possible or not KDC
Bobba et al. [1] Not robust Any Yes Has to remain
Centralized boolean function online
administration
Our scheme Robust Any monotonic Yes Need not be online
distributed KDC boolean function
row x corresponding to attribute, it also performs two scalar
multiplications to calculate C1,x, one scalar multiplication
to calculate C2,x and one to calculate C3,x. Thus, there
are a total of 4m scalar multiplications. During decryption,
there are two pairing operations, one for e(H(u), C3,x) and
the other for e(ski,u, C2,x), for each x. The number of
pairing operations is thus 2m to calculate e(H(u), C3,x).
There are also at most m scalar multiplications to calculate
(e(g, g)λxe(H(u), g)ωx)σx . Therefore, the computation time
is (2m+1)Tp+5mTm, where Tp and Tm are the time taken
to perform pairing and scalar multiplication.
Using PCB library (Pairing Based Cryptography) [40] with
an MNT curve of embedding degree k = 6 and q = 160 bit
curve, Tmul = 0.6ms and Tp = 4.5ms. For an access policy
consisting of 10 attributes, decryption time at each user is
124.5 ms. The decryption time increases linearly with the
number of attributes in the access policy.
Information to be sent from RTU to data repository,
and from the storage centers to user require m log |GT | +
2m log |G|+m2 + |Data| bits, where |Data| is the size of
the data. m2 bits are needed to transfer the matrix R, and
m(|GT |+ 2|G|) + |GT | to transfer C0, C1,x, C2,x and C3,x
and logw, to send pi. Thus, the communication overhead is
m2 +m(|GT |+ 2|G|) + |GT |+ logw + |Data|.
When revocation is required, C0 needs to be recalculated.
e(g, g) is previously calculated. So, only one scalar multi-
plication is needed. If the user revoked is Uu, then for each
x, C1,x has to be recomputed. e(g, g) is already computed.
Thus, only two scalar multiplication needs to be done, for
each x. So a total of 2m′ + 1 scalar multiplications are
done by the KDCs, where m′ is the number of attributes
belonging to all revoked users. Users need not compute
any scalar multiplication or pairing operations. Additional
communication overhead is O((m′ + 1)|GT |).
D. Comparison with other schemes
In this section we compare our access control scheme with
that of Bobba et al. [1]. We show (in Table II) that our scheme
is more robust than theirs, because ours is a decentralized
scheme. The biggest drawback of Bobba et al. [1] is that the
centralized KDC has to be online all the time to allow access
of data. This is a huge restriction, because the system will
completely shut off in case of fault or even maintenance.
VII. OPEN PROBLEMS IN SMART GRID SECURITY
The data center stores huge amounts of data and thus
maintenance of these databases can be a huge concern. One
recent proposal is to integrate smart grids with clouds. In
this context, cloud can provide infrastructure to store this
huge amount of data. There has been quite a lot of research
in information secure information retrieval using searchable
encryption [44], [45], where searching is done checking the
indices of the encrypted keywords. Result is returned without
knowing the keyword or the retrieved record.
Cables can be incorporated into the smart grid system
to enable users to get efficient access of content. Content
distributors can either provide satellite radio subscriptions
(for channels for a fixed duration like a month of a year),
or provide impulse pay-per-view facility (viewers pay as and
when they view a program like in hotels), prepaid pay-per-
view (viewers pay in advance as in for a hockey match
or a concert), pay-per-channel (viewers pay subscribe for
a channel). There are several security and privacy issues
that need to be addressed here. Efficient access control is
very important because of the large number of viewers and
attributes involved. Previous work on content access control
has been done by Pirretti et al. [46]. The question is how
to efficiently integrate them into the grid. The other issue
is of privacy, such that a viewers identity if not revealed at
any time. This might give valuable information about the
behavior of the individual.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an secure architecture in
smart grids which integrates aggregation and access control.
Homomorphic encryption is used to preserve customer pri-
vacy, while ABE is used for achieving access control. ABE
has not been used in access control in smart grids, though it
has been mentioned as a possibility in [1]. The access control
architecture is decentralized, which makes it more attractive
and practical than [1]. We have also addressed a few open
problems that can be worked on in future.
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